Between disenchants and challenges: the climate future in the era of the BRICS | América Futura

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2025 has been a turbulent year in planetary geopolitics: Donald Trump’s return with his climate denialism and his aggressive tariff war; a European Union focused more and more on its internal security above international cooperation; The resurgence of wars in the Middle East, and a remarkable geopolitical ascent of emerging powers headed by China and Brazil, organized around the BRICS block.

These days we ask ourselves who are the BRICS and what role they play in this global scenario. In response to this, here some important data: this alliance was born in 2009 as a counterweight to the G7 and in general to the institutions founded under the Bretton Woods system; Its founding members, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa give it its name, and currently has 11 full countries (including from 2023 to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran) and 13 associated countries. Together, BRICS+ countries represent more than 40% of the population, 37% of GDP and 44% of global greenhouse gas emissions. This group is undoubtedly a powerful alliance of emerging economies with great potential for economic growth and political power, which is closely to monitor how it will be outlined in the new international order.

The most recent Summit of the BRICs, held on July 6 and 7 lasts in Rio de Janeiro, was an interesting example of the dilemma that these countries have about their international leadership. In their joint statement, they addressed crucial issues such as strengthening multilateralism, climate financing and southern cooperation, and even gave support to the Brazilian initiative called tropical forests fund forever.

They also continue to advance in a determined way with one of their star initiatives to change the balance of the international financial system through its new development bank that, among other things, has a more equitable and efficient system of shareholding, governance and model of operations that other multilateral development banks, and that determined that 60% of its resources go to sustainable projects, which could boost the financing of countries in developing countries in develop South-South cooperation from direct and operational action.

However, and despite the fact that the countries of the group reaffirm their commitment to promoting fair and equitable transitions, deep contradictions persist between their political statements, the appropriation of the role they play in the global climate crisis, and their internal actions and policies. On the one hand, the river statement speaks of the climatic urgency, but insists on the importance of fossil fuels in future development and ignores any reference to renewable energies, going directly against that multilateralism they defend and their own potential incidence in the global energy transition. This is very serious because Saudi Arabia, Russia, United Arab Emirates, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa and Brazil are among the 10 main producers of oil, coal and gas in the world.

Likewise, while China and India lead globally the production of renewable energy, they still depend significantly on coal and other fossil fuels. Brazil announces ambitious commitments to stop deforestation and leads the COP30, but it intends to expand oil exploration in the Amazon, which is a very hard blow to this fragile ecosystem, to the indigenous communities that already inhabit the global climatic efforts. And Russia, which hardly applies as a country in the Global South, proposed to achieve carbon neutrality in 2060, but continues to prioritize the expansion of its exports of gas and oil in favor of its geopolitical positioning, feeding the aggression against Ukraine.

Henos here, among the countries of the global northern that have initiated a withdrawal of their global leadership, being unable to respond properly to the urgent needs of the developing world; and the nascent power of this block of emerging economies with economic and political capacity to redefine global governance, including in terms of climate action, but with the unknown of whether they will have the political will and the determination to promote a deep transformation of the current model of economic development.

In that sense, the double disenchantment, with the unfulfilled promises of the global north and with the questions around emerging leaders such as BRICS’s, accentuates the urgency of articulating a strong and autonomous regional voice in a world order in recomposition. Latin America must strategically decide how to insert itself in this new scenario, not as a passive spectator, but as the protagonist of its own climate future, with an autonomous regional agenda that promotes our own economic and energy independence and protects our ecosystems. This will also imply strategically take advantage of the current situation, in particular the temporary leadership of Brazil in the BRICs and the COP30, to demand concrete and firm climatic commitments.