He lifeng: Xi Jinping’s trusted man who has achieved the truce | Opinion

What to know languages ​​is important to repeat teachers, parents and managers of human resources daily. But maybe it is not so much. At least not for He Lifeng (China, 1955), second vice -first minister and main economic negotiator of the Chinese government, who has just agreed with the United States a 90 -day tariff truce, despite having – according to the media – a fairly limited domain of English.

The appointment in Geneva, on the 10th and 11th, was much more than a bilateral meeting. China and the US arrived with accumulated tensions and a long record of distrust. There, without cameras and with the serious tone that these meetings impose, I have met with Scott Besent, secretary of the US Treasury, to try to stop the last tariff climb. They succeeded. The agreement, although temporary, implies a substantial reduction of rates: from 125% to 10% in the Chinese case, and from 145% to 30% in the American. A 90 -day truce, at least on paper.

In the joint statement, both governments talked about “sincere conversations” and the importance of maintaining dialogue. The creation of a permanent mechanism to manage commercial differences was also announced. Nothing especially novel, but significant for the moment.

He is not a new face, although his figure has begun to acquire international visibility only in recent years. Since 2023, he directs the office of the Central Commission of Financial and Economic Affairs of the Communist Party, the nerve center where the key decisions on the economic course of the country are made. Before him, that position was occupied by Liu He, a figure recognized for his ability to interlocate with the West, and Harvard student. With the departure of Liu, I have assumed the function of economic tsar of the Chinese government. Not with the same style, but with the same level of influence.

His profile responds to another type of leadership: less visible, more bureaucratic, deeply aligned with the president’s vision, Xi Jinping. Their relationship dates back to the 80s, when both worked in the province of Fujian. XI was then vice -mayor of Xiamen; He, a newly graduated young official. Since then, his career has gone in parallel to that of the president, with constant promotions, always linked to the economic apparatus of the party.

I was born in a Rural County in Fujian, in a family in the Hakka ethnic group. Like so many of his generation, he lived reeducation in the field during the cultural revolution. Then he entered the University of Xiamen in 1979 and trained in finance. He completed his education with a doctorate in economics, and officially entered the Communist Party in 1981.

After years in the local and the provincial administration – including stages in Xiamen, Fuzhou and the Port City of Tianjin, where the nickname was the demolition for its ambitious urban renewal projects – his career made the jump nationwide in 2014, when he was appointed deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission. In 2017 he went to direct it, assuming the responsibility of drawing the macroeconomic policies of the country. From there he promoted strategic plans such as the initiative of the Strip and the Route, and consolidated a model based on the leadership of the State on the market.

In 2023 he was appointed second Vice Prime Minister, in charge of the economic area. The main body of power of the party also joined the political bureau. With this, he became the main technical figure behind the economic strategy of XI, whom he has accompanied for decades and with whom he maintains unusual personal confidence in the high spheres of Chinese power.

His style, however, has not convinced everyone out of the country. In his first international appearances, he was perceived as a rigid, very formal negotiator, surrounded by assistants and with little communicative ease. In an event with entrepreneurs in 2024, some of those present described him as “too technical” and lacking charisma. An investor came to compare it with “an artificial intelligence that answers with scheduled answers.”

Even so, that image seems to be changing. In recent months, several diplomats and businessmen who have met with him have noticed a different attitude: more security, greater capacity to specify agreements, less rigidity. A high US executive summarizes the general impression: “Now he knows how to talk to Western interlocutors.” Some media have begun to refer to him as “the solucity” of XI, someone who, without making noise, manages to unlock negotiations and fulfill orders.

In the ideological, I have represents continuity. His vision is fully statist: he considers that the State must mark the course of the economy, and does not believe that the opening to the foreign market should be detrimental to political control. In this it differs clearly from figures such as Liu He, more reformist and with better reception in global financial circles. I have embodies the profile that the president prefers: disciplined, loyal and without own ambitions, beyond executing the strategy of the party.

It does not have the brightness of a reformist or the charism of a born diplomat. Nor do I need it. Its role is not to enchant markets, but to accurately execute the XI economic roadmap. In a system where loyalty weighs more than creativity, its figure embodies the type of power that is not exhibited, but that is imposed. I have represents a China who does not seek to adapt to the world, but to teach him the rules of his own game.